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Abstract 
This paper adds to the literature on the impact of non-residents’ activity in the markets for 
sovereign debt issued by emerging economies. The conducted study indicates that there exists 
a statistically significant long-run relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ 
debt held by foreign investors and the level of yields on that debt. An inflow of non-residents 
equivalent to a 1-percent increase of the value of their sovereign emerging countries’ debt 
portfolio induces a decline in yields on bonds issued by those countries by slightly more than 
3 basis points. The cointegration analysis has been additionally performed separately for each 
of the following sub-categories of foreign investors: foreign official sector, foreign banks, and 
other foreign investors, taking advantage of the dataset made available by Arslanalp and 
Tsuda (2014). The obtained results indicate that the above mentioned relationship exists with 
respect to the latter two sub-categories only. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The past two and a half decades saw a massive inflow of capital to a number of developing 
economies. According to the estimates of the Institute of International Finance, annual private 
capital inflows to emerging market surged from around USD 50 billion in 1990 to almost 
USD 1 160 billion in 2014. Although the increase was far from monotonic, with financial 
crises adversely affecting international capital movements, the amount of funds flowing to the 
developing countries experienced much shorter-lived retrenchments than in the case of the 
developed economies – even after the dramatic collapse in the aftermath of the 2008’s shock 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011). 
 
Studies confirm that aggregate inflows to emerging economies generally exhibit considerable 
co-movement (Cerutti, Claessens and Puy 2015), which may be due to, inter alia, the role 
global benchmarks play in allocating capital internationally (Arslanalp and Tsuda 2015). Less 
differentiated capital flows to emerging markets were particularly pronounced during the 
recent prolonged period of near-zero interest rates in advanced economies (Arslanalp and 
Tsuda 2014). Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that global investors, at least after 2008, 
have indeed become aware of certain structural differences between individual developing 
countries (Ahmed, Brahima and Andrei 2015). 
 
This heterogeneity makes it all the more challenging to analyse the determinants of capital 
flows to emerging economies (Koepke 2015 provides a comprehensive review of empirical 
studies on this issue). One particularly useful line of distinction is between push (often 
associated with global) and pull (local) factors. Some pre-crisis studies tend to attach similar 
weight to both types (Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi 1998). Other emphasise the different 
functions each of them has been observed to perform: recurrently occurring surges in capital 
inflows arise due to global factors, but it is the local characteristics of individual recipient 
economies that determine the actual destinations of those flows (Fratzscher 2011, Ghosh et al. 
2014). In should be mentioned, however, that some studies take the opposing view, by 
highlighting the relevance of global factors during market stress (Forbes and Warnock 2012). 
 
By determining the amount of capital flows to emerging economies, both global and local 
factors also affect the costs of borrowing funds in the international markets by those countries. 
Some studies indicate that the extent to which local (e.g. fiscal) variables exert influence on 
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domestic bond yields depends on the level of global risk aversion: in “normal” times pull 
factors seem to be less important, but in times of elevated market stress global investors tend 
to pay more attention to country-specific fundamentals (Jaramillo and Weber 2012). The local 
fundamentals that determine emerging economies’ borrowing costs are not confined to 
standard macroeconomic and fiscal variables. As evidenced by Jaramillo and Zhang (2013), 
the ownership structure of government securities may be equally, or even more important. 
They argue that while bond yields tend to rise along with an increase in the debt to GDP ratio, 
this may be offset if the additional debt is financed by domestic real money investors. 
 
The issue of the investor structure in the emerging countries’ sovereign debt markets has 
recently become addressed in the literature because of its relevance for the analysis of bond 
markets and, more generally, country credit risk, with the credit default premium embedded in 
bond yields. There are at least two good reasons why studying the role of one particular group 
of investors in the emerging economies’ debt markets, namely non-residents, seems 
increasingly important: 
 over the past decade or so a growing number of sovereign borrowers continued to increase 
their reliance on foreign investors (Arslanalp and Tsuda 2012), and an increasing number 
of emerging countries structurally shifted to issuing debt denominated in domestic 
currencies (Daniel 2008), bought by both domestic and foreign investors, 
 the typically evoked, and broadly agreed upon in the literature (see e.g. Peiris 2010, 
Pradhan et al. 2011, Andritzky 2012, Carvalho and Fidora 2014, Ebeke and Lu 2014, Lee 
2014, Ebeke and Kyobe 2015), benefit of foreign investors’ increased presence in the 
emerging economies’ debt markets, i.e. an overall decline in bond yields, may be masking 
significant risk of a reversal in international capital flows, cumulating in the global 
financial system. 
 
The above mentioned risk may be exacerbated due to extraordinary circumstances the global 
economy is currently in, as well as some specific features of the emerging economies’ 
sovereign bond markets. Firstly, the abundance of capital in the global financial markets, 
fuelled by near-zero interest rates and unconventional monetary policy pursued by a number 
of major central banks, leads to a search for yield by numerous international institutional 
investors. Their investment in emerging countries’ bond markets, as exhibited in the literature 
cited above, contributes to a decline in yields on sovereign bonds issued by those countries, 
which may lead to asset bubbles with inflated prices hiding the true credit, market and 
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liquidity risk (Carvalho and Fidora 2014). Secondly, even a fairly small investment in the 
local sovereign bond markets of some emerging economies may have a disproportionately 
strong impact on yields due to relatively low secondary market liquidity (Pradhan et al. 2011, 
Mishra et al. 2014). It should be mentioned, however, that some studies take the opposing 
view, arguing that relatively high bond market liquidity may be an incentive for some foreign 
investors to withdraw from the market in reaction to elevated global risk aversion at little or 
no costs (Aizenmann, Binici and Hutchison 2014, Eichengreen and Gupta 2014), and 
highlighting the need for robust fundamentals to prevent bond yields from an abrupt surge in 
stress times (Ahmed, Brahima and Andrei 2015). Thirdly, the results of some studies indicate 
that the set of policy measures to be effectively taken by relevant authorities in order to 
prevent the outflow of capital from the local bond market is rather limited (Calvo, Leiderman 
and Reinhart 1993, 1996). 
 
This paper seeks to extend the existing literature on the potential impact of non-residents’ 
activity in the markets for sovereign debt issued by emerging economies. Using panel 
econometric techniques, the conducted analysis aims to examine, whether there is a long-run 
causal relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by foreign investors 
and the level of yields on that debt. Bond yields can be interpreted in this context in terms of 
both costs of borrowing in financial markets, and sovereign risk. Against the background of 
the existing studies, in which a number of different modelling approaches are applied, this 
paper takes advantage of cointegration analysis. The quarterly data used for the purpose of 
this analysis pertain to a set of 18 emerging economies and cover the period of 2004-2014. 
 
One further area of investigation pursued in this paper consists in the disaggregation of 
emerging markets’ debt holdings by non-residents into three types of foreign investors: 
foreign official sector, foreign banks, and other foreign investors. The potential relationship 
between the amount of debt held by each of those sub-categories of foreign investors and the 
level of yields on that debt is examined separately, in order to pick up any possible significant 
differences in the way their activity exerts influence on individual domestic bond markets of 
the developing countries. Such level of data disaggregation is possible owing to the dataset 
compiled and made publicly available by Arslanalp and Tsuda (2012, 2014). Because of the 
uniqueness of this dataset, the existing literature studying the impact of individual groups of 
non-residents on the emerging economies’ debt markets is extremely scarce. This avenue of 
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research with the aim to assess the potential impact on bond yields, but with different 
methodology applied, so far has been pursued by Lee (2014). 
 
For the purpose of this study the term “emerging economies” shall be used interchangeably 
with “developing economies”, “developing countries”, “emerging countries”, as well as 
“emerging markets”, with the latter emphasising the significance of financial system 
development. All of the above refer to a number of countries sharing one common feature: 
they are somewhat (in some aspects) similar to the developed economies, but are not yet (or 
not anymore) developed economies. Which country is, and which is not “developed” 
(sometimes also labelled “advanced” or “high-income”), may be determined in many ways. 
Some of the most frequently referred to definitions or classifications are those used by the 
IMF, the World Bank or the United Nations. But irrespective of the definition applied, one 
remarkable characteristic of almost any set of “emerging economies” is the strong 
heterogeneity of such a group of countries, with respect to, inter alia, their size, wealth, 
geographical location, institutional framework, political regime, as well as a number of 
strictly economic features, such as the stage of financial development, currency regime or 
financial stability. Also, for the sake of simplicity, the term “government debt” shall be used 
interchangeably with “sovereign debt”, mostly consisting of actively traded government debt 
securities (i.e. Treasury bonds and bills). Unless indicated otherwise, the term “sovereign 
risk” can be associated for the purpose of this study with “country risk”, and in particular with 
“country credit risk”. 
 
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: section 2 presents some key features 
of government debt markets in the set of emerging economies under analysis; section 3 
elaborates on the empirical analysis of a long-run relationship between the amount of 
emerging countries’ debt held by foreign investors and the level of yields on that debt; section 
4 summarises and concludes.  
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2. Key features of government debt markets in selected emerging economies 
 
For the purpose of this study three features of the sovereign debt markets in the analysed 
countries are considered particularly important: market size (absolute and relative to the size 
of the economy), investor structure (including the share of non-residents) and the evolution of 
bond yields. In the remainder of this section each of those aspects is discussed in more detail. 
 
2.1. Market size 
 
A country’s indebtedness and costs of debt servicing, together with the net budget position, 
are one of the major determinants of sovereign credit risk. The significance of those factors 
has long been identified in the literature, beginning with the seminal paper by Edwards 
(1984), whose analysis indicated that foreign debt and the costs of servicing thereof are the 
key drivers of sovereign risk (current account balance, foreign reserves and investment rate 
being some of the other significant factors). The size of a country’s debt determines the extent 
to which an economy is leveraged: along with an increase in the debt to GDP ratio, surges the 
likelihood that the government will be unable to meet its commitments, leading to a sovereign 
default. This said, it is important to look at both the absolute and the relative value of debt in 
order to evaluate, whether an economy is capable of generating sufficient revenues to cover 
the current expenses (including for the purpose of servicing debt). Indebtedness, as well as 
other “fiscal” variables, may also be perceived as a proxy of a country’s proneness to 
financial, including fiscal, shocks (Baldacci et al. 2008). 
 
The analysed countries vastly differ in terms of the size of their respective government debt 
markets, both in absolute values, and relative to their GDP (Chart 1). One feature most of 
them share is that in the long run the markets for emerging countries’ sovereign bonds, which 
constitute the majority of total government debt, tend to develop, some of them exhibiting 
a rather high-paced growth. 
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Chart 1. Total general government gross debt (blue bars, in local currency billion, left-
hand axis) and debt to GDP ratio (red lines, in percent, right-hand axis) of selected 
emerging markets, 2004-2014 
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Source: own calculations based on an online dataset made available by Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/Data/wp1439.zip. 
 
2.2. Market structure 
 
Sovereign debt markets of individual countries can be analysed in many different aspects, 
including, but not limited to: currency structure, term structure, interest rate sensitivity and the 
structure of creditors – most notably bondholders. The latter breakdown, in particular the 
activity of foreign investors, is particularly important for the analysis of emerging economies’ 
government debt markets, as it holds the key to a better understanding of at least some of the 
other aspects of those markets’ structure. For example, foreign-currency-denominated 
emerging markets’ debt is typically held by non-residents. Also, foreign investors, especially 
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banks and some groups of financial institutions (such as hedge funds) tend to prefer short- to 
medium-term debt instruments, due to greater secondary market liquidity and relatively lower 
responsiveness to interest rate changes, whereas some groups of both foreign, and domestic 
investors, such as investment or pension funds, are more likely to choose long-term bonds. 
With respect to the debt issued by countries with high inflation, non-residents typically 
prioritise floating-rate and inflation-indexed bonds to fixed-rate instruments. On top of that, in 
many emerging economies the sovereign bond portfolios held by non-residents are simply too 
large to ignore (Chart 2).  
Chart 2. Total general government gross debt of selected emerging markets by type of 
investors, 2004-2014 (in local currency billion) 
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Note: (bottom-up) blue bars – domestic investors, red bars – foreign official sector, green bars – foreign banks, 
violet bars – other foreign investors. 
Source: own calculations based on an online dataset made available by Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/Data/wp1439.zip. 
The above mentioned size of foreign investors’ portfolios of sovereign bonds issued by 
emerging economies, as well as their activity in the secondary market for those instruments, is 
of particular importance for the purpose of the analysis conducted in this study. This is not 
only because of the impact that an inflow of non-residents may have on bond yields (and, 
thereby, on the costs of sovereign debt financing), which is empirically examined in the 
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subsequent section of this paper, but also because of the implications of this influence on 
financial stability of the emerging markets. Beyond a certain threshold the inflow of non-
residents to the local sovereign debt market may be detrimental to financial stability. 
Countries overly dependent on external financing may experience severe turbulences with 
respect to their local bond and FX markets, should capital flows abruptly reverse (Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart 1993, 1996). This may be triggered, inter alia, by a sudden shift in 
the expected profitability of investment alternatives (a recent example of the expected 
monetary policy tightening by the Federal Reserve seems relevant) or an unexpected rise in 
global risk aversion, especially in times of elevated tensions in global financial markets. 
 
Therefore there is much potential value added in a more granular analysis of foreign 
investors’ involvement in emerging economies’ government debt markets. Traditionally, non-
residents are grouped together and analysed as a whole. Meanwhile, they constitute 
a heterogeneous set of investors, consisting of, inter alia: central banks, commercial banks 
(including investment banks), hedge funds, mutual and investment funds, pension funds, 
sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies, and even non-financial corporations. Each type 
of institutions can display different investment preferences, for example regarding the time 
horizon of an investment, different risk tolerance, and, subsequently, different patterns of 
behaviour – especially under stress scenarios. Even though the literature on this topic is rather 
scarce, most likely due to the paucity of data of sufficient granularity, there is some evidence 
in the related literature that certain groups of investors may be preferable to others from the 
emerging markets’ stability perspective, due to their individual investment profiles (Jaramillo 
and Zhang 2013, Lee 2014). This study aims to make the most of the dataset made available 
courtesy of Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014), revealing significant discrepancies in the structure of 
foreign investors in the emerging economies’ government debt markets (Chart 2). 
 
2.3. The evolution of bond yields 
 
The overview of emerging economies’ government bond markets would be incomplete 
without an analysis of changes in market prices of those instruments, reflecting to some extent 
the evolution of those economies’ perceived creditworthiness. For the sake of better 
comparability, yields on the most liquid local-currency-denominated government benchmark 
bonds shall be used. Bond yields encompass a wide variety of market-based information, but 
first and foremost they reflect the credit risk of the issuer, and in this study shall be used as 
13 
 
a proxy for sovereign credit risk. They are essentially influenced by a number of other factors, 
including, but not limited to, market liquidity and exchange rate volatility (Gadanecz, 
Miyajima and Shu 2014), which may at times cloud the assessment of the pure credit risk 
premium using bond yields alone (see Hull et al. 2005). However, there seems to be little 
room for manoeuvre due to limited availability of complete (or near-complete) data series on 
alternative measures, such as the CDS premia, with respect to a number of emerging 
economies. 
 
A glance at the evolution of emerging economies’ government bond yields reveals that there 
seems to be much heterogeneity among the group of analysed emerging markets in terms of 
their creditworthiness, as well as their sensitivity to the developments in the global financial 
markets (Chart 3). Furthermore, yields on bonds issued by some of the economies under 
consideration exhibit an overall decreasing trend, which reflects an overall improvement in 
their financial condition and the ongoing process of gradual “maturing” of those countries. 
Market prices of bonds issued by some other economies, Russia being a noteworthy example, 
clearly respond to certain idiosyncratic shocks. 
Chart 3. Yields on local-currency-denominated government 5-year benchmark bonds 
issued by selected emerging economies (blue lines, in percent, left-hand axis) and total 
general government gross debt held by non-residents (red bars, in local currency billion, 
right-hand axis), 2004-2014 
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Source: own calculations based on an online dataset made available by Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/Data/wp1439.zip, as well as Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg and 
OECD data. 
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3. Empirical analysis 
 
The empirical analysis conducted for the purpose of this study aims to examine, whether there 
exists a long-run causal relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by 
foreign investors and the level of yields on that debt. This is performed both at the aggregate 
level (i.e. for the total non-residents’ portfolio), and separately for each of the following sub-
categories of foreign investors: foreign official sector, foreign banks, and other foreign 
investors. 
 
3.1. Data 
 
Quarterly data covering the period of 2004-2014 have been used to analyse the above 
mentioned relationship for the following set of emerging economies: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. The set of countries for the analysis has 
been restricted to those developing countries only due to limited availability of data on bond 
yields. Therefore the panel consists of 18 emerging markets (cross-sectional dimension) and 
44 quarterly observations (time dimension). 
 
The complete data on emerging economies’ total general government gross debt held by 
foreign investors have been acquired from the dataset compiled and made publicly available 
by Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014). This holds for both the aggregate, and its components, 
namely the debt held by: foreign official sector, foreign banks and other foreign investors. 
 
Yields on local-currency-denominated government 5-year benchmark bonds (10-year bonds 
for Peru) issued by the emerging economies under examination have been obtained 
predominantly from Thomson Reuters, though some gaps were filled by comparable data 
from Bloomberg and OECD. The data on yields are complete for 9 out of 18 countries in the 
sample; for further 3 countries there is a single observation missing in each case; three to 
seven quarterly observations are missing with respect to 4 countries; the largest gaps are for 
Peru and Brazil, with thirteen and fifteen data points missing, respectively. 
 
The data on non-residents’ debt holdings are in billions of local currency, and data on bond 
yields in percent. 
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3.2. Estimation results 
 
The objective of the analysis is to establish, whether there exists a long-run causal relationship 
between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by foreign investors and the level of 
yields on that debt (Y). This has been performed separately for the total non-residents’ 
portfolio (FI_tot), and for each of the following sub-categories of foreign investors: foreign 
official sector (FI_fos), foreign banks (FI_fb), and other foreign investors (FI_ofi). The 
variables FI_ were converted to logs, which allows for a more convenient interpretation of the 
long-run coefficients in terms of semi-elasticities. 
 
An investigation of dynamic properties of the analysed series has been performed using 
a battery of standard panel unit root tests, namely the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002, LLC) test, 
the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, IPS) test and the Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test (Maddala and Wu 1999). The tests strongly suggest non-stationarity of all 
variables (Table 1). Furthermore, in all cases the results indicate integration of order one 
(Table 2), which allows for the application of the long-run analysis. 
Table 1. Panel unit root tests – variables in levels 
Variable LLC IPS ADF 
Y 0.705 -0.430 36.21 
FI_tot 9.838 11.927 7.632 
FI_fos 2.231 3.226 21.407 
FI_fb 2.671 2.958 26.754 
FI_ofi 11.09 12.386 4.975 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations. 
Table 2. Panel unit root tests – variables in first differences 
Variable LLC IPS ADF 
Y -19.324*** -19.521*** 373.327*** 
FI_tot -20.056*** -19.117*** 346.439*** 
FI_fos -2.302** -6.223*** 146.389*** 
FI_fb -15.102*** -12.111*** 269.895*** 
FI_ofi -6.827*** -6.511*** 156.629*** 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations. 
Panel cointegration tests developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) have been employed (Table 3). 
In all cases, except for the relationship between Y and FI_fos, the results unequivocally 
support the existence of cointegration between variables in the system. Out of seven Pedroni 
test statistics, only group rho and group PP indicate no cointegration between Y and FI_fos. 
However, Monte Carlo experiments performed by Pedroni (2004) show that those two 
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statistics are characterised by the lowest power and, as such, are more prone to fail to reject 
false null hypothesis of no cointegration. Therefore it has been assumed that the obtained 
results confirm the existence of the long-run equilibrium with respect to all pairs of examined 
variables. 
Table 3. Panel cointegration tests between yields on bonds issued by the emerging 
countries (Y) and the amount of debt held by foreign investors 
Test statistics FI_tot FI_fos FI_fb FI_ofi 
Panel v statistic 2.931*** 1.699** 1.757** 3.644*** 
Panel rho statistic -3.281*** -1.698** -2.043** -4.414*** 
Panel PP statistic -2.597*** -1.440* -1.753** -3.525*** 
Panel ADF statistic -3.296*** -2.499*** -2.173** -3.545*** 
Group rho statistic -1.691** -1.110 -1.671** -2.498*** 
Group PP statistic -1.670** -1.235 -1.566* -2.499*** 
Group ADF statistic -2.264*** -2.593*** -2.306*** -2.665*** 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations. 
The parameters of the cointegrating vector have been estimated by means of the group-mean 
FMOLS estimator (fully-modified ordinary least squares, Phillips and Moon 1999). In all 
cases, except for FI_fos, the long-run semi-elasticity is significantly negative (Table 4). 
Insignificant long-run parameter in the case of the relation between Y and FI_fos points to no 
cointegration, as was suggested by mixed results of panel cointegration tests for this pair of 
variables (Table 3). 
Table 4. Estimated long-run semi-elasticity of yields on bonds issued by the emerging 
countries (Y) with respect to the amount of debt held by foreign investors 
Debt held by foreign investors 
Estimated long-run semi-
elasticity of Y 
FI_tot -3.090*** 
FI_fos -0.191 
FI_fb -1.700* 
FI_ofi -2.114*** 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations. 
The direction of long-run causality has been established within the Engle-Granger framework: 
jtjtjtjtjtj utotFIYtotFIY    )_
ˆˆ(_= 1,101,,10,  
jtjtjtjtjtj utotFIYYtotFI    )_
ˆˆ(=_ 1,101,
'
,
'
1
'
0, , 
where: 
Y – yields on local-currency-denominated government 5-year benchmark bonds issued by 
selected emerging economies, 
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FI_tot – log of total general government gross debt held by foreign investors, 
γ and γ' – error correction terms, 
1ˆ  – estimate of long-run semi-elasticity. 
 
Analogous equations have been estimated with FI_tot replaced with FI_fb and FI_ofi. FI_fos 
has been excluded from the analysis due to lack of cointegration with Y. In all cases the 
results of weak exogeneity tests (Table 5) clearly indicate that the amount of debt held by 
foreign investors (total, as well as individual sub-categories of non-residents) causes yields on 
bonds issued by the emerging countries in the long run. 
Table 5. Weak exogeneity tests 
Debt held by foreign 
investors 
γ γ' 
FI_tot -0.147*** 0.001 
FI_fb -0.136** 0.001 
FI_ofi -0.137** -0.001 
Notes: one, two and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
The conducted analysis indicates that there exists a statistically significant long-run 
relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by foreign investors (as 
a broad category) and the level of yields on that debt, with the former being the cause of the 
latter. The negative sign of the coefficient implies that an inflow of non-residents to the 
government debt markets of the examined emerging economies equivalent to a 1-percent 
increase of the value of their portfolio induces a decline in yields on bonds issued by those 
countries by slightly more than 3 basis points. 
 
At the disaggregated level, the analysis indicates a statistically significant long-run 
relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by private non-bank foreign 
investors and the level of yields on that debt, as well as between the amount of emerging 
countries’ debt held by foreign banks and the level of yields on that debt. In both cases the 
former is the cause of the latter. The impact of changes in the amount of debt held by “other 
foreign investors” (consisting of a variety of different groups: from hedge and mutual funds 
on one end, through pension funds, insurance companies, to individual investors on the other) 
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on emerging economies’ bond yields seems to be somewhat stronger than in the case of 
foreign banks (Table 4). In both cases an inflow to the government debt markets equivalent to 
a 1-percent increase of the value of the portfolio held by each of the two sub-categories 
induces a decline in yields on bonds issued by the examined emerging markets: on average by 
2.1 and 1.7 basis points, respectively. The insignificant long-run parameter in the case of the 
relation between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by the foreign official sector 
and the level of yields on that debt points to no cointegration. 
 
With respect to the relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by 
foreign investors (as a broad category) and the level of yields on that debt, the results obtained 
in this study and the results of other empirical studies in the literature are not fully 
comparable. This is due to differences in samples, both in terms of the analysed countries and 
time periods, and even more importantly – in the way the impact of an inflow of non-residents 
to the sovereign debt market is measured. The existing literature typically examines the 
impact of an increase in the share of foreign investors in the structure of debt holders, e.g. by 
1 percentage point. In this study a different approach has been assumed, analysing the impact 
of an increase in the value of foreign investors’ sovereign debt portfolio, e.g. by 1 percent. 
The actual amount of funds (in billions of local currency) necessary to induce a 1-percent 
change in the value of non-residents’ portfolio is significantly lower (in the analysed sample, 
over 7 times lower on average) than the amount of funds necessary to induce a change in the 
share of non-residents in the structure of debt holders by a single percentage point. Therefore 
somewhat smaller estimated long-run semi-elasticity of yields on bonds issued by the 
emerging countries have been expected than the comparable coefficients obtained in other 
empirical studies. 
 
The results of those other empirical studies indicate the same direction of the relationship 
between the above mentioned variables, and a broadly similar, though somewhat greater, 
order of its magnitude: 
 Peiris (2010): a 1 percentage point increase in the share of foreign investors in the 
government bond market lowers yields by about 6 basis points on average; 
 Pradhan et al. (2011): each percentage point increase in non-resident participation reduces 
long-term bond yields by about 5 basis points on average; 
 Andritzky (2012): a 10 percentage point increase in the share of holdings by non-resident 
investors is associated with 32 to 43 basis points lower yields; 
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 Carvalho and Fidora (2014): a one percentage point increase in foreign holdings of debt 
securities lowers the long-term interest rate by about 13 basis points; 
 Ebeke and Lu (2014): a 10 percentage point increase in the share of foreign investors in the 
government bond market is associated with a reduction in yields of 70 to 90 basis points; 
 Lee (2014): a 1 percentage point increase in the share of holdings by foreign investors is 
associated with about 3 basis points lower yields; 
 Ebeke and Kyobe (2015): in the case of local currency-denominated government bonds, 
a 1 percentage point increase in foreign participation decreases the level of the yield by 6 
to 8 basis points, depending on the specification of the model. 
 
As regards the relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by 
individual sub-categories of foreign investors and the level of yields on that debt, the only 
comparable study has been conducted by Lee (2014). The results thereof are broadly in line 
with this study, indicating a statistically significant relationship for private non-bank foreign 
investors and foreign banks only. However, even though the direction of the relationship for 
the above mentioned variables is the same as in this study, Lee (2014) suggests that the order 
of magnitude of the estimated impact is significantly greater. 
 
Another way to interpret the results obtained in this study is that the inflow of foreign 
investors tends to reduce the costs of debt financing for emerging markets. This is in line with 
expectations and rather unsurprising, considering that the analysed timeframe includes several 
years of very low risk aversion (before the global financial crisis), as well as the recent period 
of unconventional monetary policy pursued by a number of major central banks, resulting in 
record low interest rate in the base markets. 
 
However, even though bond yields are one of the most commonly used proxies for sovereign 
credit risk (and employed for this very purpose in this study as well), their decline in response 
to the inflow of non-residents to the domestic debt market should not at all times and under all 
circumstances be perceived in terms of decreasing probability of default. The above 
mentioned low interest rates environment, facilitating the access to abundant liquidity for 
global investors, induces large-scale search for yield, which may distort the true risk-return 
profile of investment in some emerging countries’ government debt instruments. In reality, 
artificially enhanced global demand for risky assets may be causing asset price bubbles with 
22 
 
respect to the local bond markets of some developing economies. This, in turn, may lead to 
the mispricing of credit risk, masking behind extraordinarily low yields. 
 
The obtained negative sign of the coefficient also implies that a potential outflow of non-
residents (in general, or of certain groups of foreign investors) from the government debt 
markets of the emerging economies induces an increase in yields on bonds issued by those 
countries. In those markets where non-residents hold a significant share of sovereign debt 
their abrupt withdrawal may lead to panic and fire sales by other investors, especially if there 
is not sufficient structural demand on behalf of the domestic investors. Also, the set of policy 
measures which could be undertaken by relevant authorities, e.g. central banks, in order to 
prevent the outflow of capital from the local bond market is rather limited. 
 
Therefore it seems important from an economic policy point of view to have a detailed insight 
into the structure of sovereign debt holders, as different groups of investors can display 
different investment preferences or risk tolerance, and in consequence also different patterns 
of behaviour – especially during periods of elevated global risk aversion. 
 
 
 
 
  
23 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper adds to the literature on the impact of non-residents’ activity in the markets for 
sovereign debt issued by emerging economies. Against the background of the existing studies, 
in which a number of different modelling approaches are applied, this paper takes advantage 
of cointegration analysis. The conducted study indicates that there exists a statistically 
significant long-run relationship between the amount of emerging countries’ debt held by 
foreign investors (at the aggregate level, i.e. for the total non-residents’ portfolio) and the 
level of yields on that debt, with the former being the cause of the latter. The negative sign of 
the coefficient implies that an inflow of non-residents to the government debt markets of the 
examined emerging economies equivalent to a 1-percent increase of the value of their 
portfolio induces a decline in yields on bonds issued by those countries by slightly more than 
3 basis points. This result is somewhat lower than in other empirical studies on this topic, 
which can be traced back to the fact that the impact of an increase in the value of foreign 
investors’ sovereign debt portfolio has been analysed, rather than the impact of an increase in 
the share of foreign investors in the structure of debt holders. 
  
In order to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between the amount of emerging 
countries’ debt held by foreign investors and the level of yields on that debt, the cointegration 
analysis has been additionally performed separately for each of the following sub-categories 
of foreign investors: foreign official sector, foreign banks, and other foreign investors. The 
results thereof indicate that the above mentioned relationship exists with respect to the latter 
two sub-categories only. The long-run semi-elasticity exhibits somewhat lower magnitude in 
the case of individual groups of non-residents, as compared to the one estimated at the 
aggregate level, with the impact of changes in the amount of debt held by private non-bank 
foreign investors on emerging economies’ bond yields being slightly stronger than in the case 
of foreign banks. 
 
The obtained results indicate that an inflow of foreign investors tends to reduce the costs of 
debt financing for emerging markets. However, even though bond yields are one of the most 
commonly used proxies for sovereign credit risk, their decline in response to the inflow of 
non-residents to the domestic debt market should not be at all times perceived in terms of 
decreasing probability of default. It may be the case that with respect to the local bond 
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markets of some developing economies their sovereign credit risk may be mispriced, masking 
behind extraordinarily low yields. 
 
What is more, the negative sign of the coefficient also implies that a potential outflow of non-
residents from the government debt markets of the emerging economies induces an increase in 
yields on bonds issued by those countries. In those markets where non-residents hold 
a significant share of sovereign debt their abrupt withdrawal may lead to panic and fire sales 
by other investors. This may be more pronounced in cases where there is not sufficient 
structural demand on behalf of the domestic investors, especially that the set of policy 
measures to be effectively taken by relevant authorities in order to prevent the outflow of 
capital from the local bond market is rather limited (even if a central bank has both the 
necessary resources and the proper legal framework in place, interventions in the local bond 
market may trigger adverse side effects). 
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